Citing: Bribery of Public Officials and Witnesses (18 USC § 201)
- Third Circuit to enforce 18 U.S.C. SEC. 201 Bribery of Public Officials
to repeal the Glass Steagall Act go and check who voted to "repeal"
the Non Repealable.
FindLaw provides 18
U.S.C. § 201 : US Code - Section 201: Bribery of public
18 U.S.C. § 201 proscribes bribery and the acceptance of certain
gratuities. The
6.18.201C1B
Receiving Illegal Gratuity by a Public Official (18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(
NOTE:
Text of the Glass-Steagall Act -
Scribd
www.scribd.com/doc/29150973 Complete text of the Glass Steagall-Act
of 1933. Upload. Log in. ...
and the district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction of all such suits;
and the district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction of all such suits;
Yes there is Common Law Remedy.
Constitutional Common Law-Supremacy Clause i.e.,
Supremacy Clause Law & Legal
.
Supremacy
Clause Law & Legal Definition
The Supremacy Clause states:
"This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be Supreme Law of the land; and the Judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding."
According to U.S. law treaties are those international agreements that receive the advice and consent of the Senate. (Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution). A treaty to which United States is a party is given status equal to that of a federal legislation and therefore forms a part of the Supreme law of the land.
This concept of federal supremacy was first developed by Chief Justice John Marshall in McCulloch v. Md., 17 U.S. 316, 406 (U.S. 1819), where the court held that the State of Maryland could not tax the Second Bank of United States, a branch of the National Bank. It was concluded that "the government of the Union, though limited in its power, is supreme and its laws, when made in pursuance of the constitution, form the supreme law of the land, "any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."
In Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 632 (U.S. 1982) it was held that “a state statute is void to the extent that it actually conflicts with a valid federal statute” and that a conflict will be found either where compliance with both federal and state law is impossible or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
Similarly in Stone v. San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 862 (9th Cir. Cal. 1992) the court held on the issue of injunction and remediation, that "otherwise valid state laws or court orders cannot stand in the way of a federal court's remedial scheme if the action is essential to enforce the scheme. State policy must give way when it operates to hinder vindication of federal constitutional guarantees." http://definitions.uslegal.com/s/supremacy-clause/
1. In Section 9 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress implemented the constitutional grant:
". . . the district courts . . . shall also have exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction . . . saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it . . . see 53. 53 1 Stat. 76-77, The provision has been carried over in somwhat altered language, into 28 U.S.C.A. Stat. 1333; see infra at note 125.
You will find it in Law of Admiralty under Admiralty Jurisdiction in the United States. The Jurisdiction and Procedure of Courts Sec. 1-9. Cl.
Some of us kept our old Original Jurisdiction law books. V.K.D. http://nesaranews.blogspot.com/2014/03/breach-of-trust-fee-schedule.html#comment-form
". . . the district courts . . . shall also have exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction . . . saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it . . . see 53. 53 1 Stat. 76-77, The provision has been carried over in somwhat altered language, into 28 U.S.C.A. Stat. 1333; see infra at note 125.
You will find it in Law of Admiralty under Admiralty Jurisdiction in the United States. The Jurisdiction and Procedure of Courts Sec. 1-9. Cl.
Some of us kept our old Original Jurisdiction law books. V.K.D. http://nesaranews.blogspot.com/2014/03/breach-of-trust-fee-schedule.html#comment-form
- U.S.
Code › Title 28 › Part IV › Chapter 85 › § 1333
Glass–Steagall “repeal” and the financial crisis
Robert
Kuttner, Joseph Stiglitz, Elizabeth
Warren, Robert Weissman, Richard
D. Wolff and others have tied Glass–Steagall repeal to the late-2000s financial crisis. Kuttner
acknowledged “de facto enroads” before Glass–Steagall “repeal” but argued the
GLBA’s “repeal” had permitted “super-banks” to “re-enact the same kinds of
structural conflicts of interest that were endemic in the 1920s,” which he
characterized as “lending to speculators, packaging and securitizing credits
and then selling them off, wholesale or retail, and extracting fees at every
step along the way.”[47]
Stiglitz argued “the most important consequence of Glass–Steagall repeal” was
in changing the culture of commercial banking so that the “bigger risk” culture
of investment banking “came out on top.”[48]
He also argued the GLBA “created ever larger banks that were too big to be
allowed to fail,” which “provided incentives for excessive risk taking.”[49]
Warren explained Glass–Steagall had kept banks from doing “crazy things.” She
credited FDIC insurance, the Glass–Steagall separation of investment banking,
and SEC regulations as providing “50 years without a crisis” and argued that
crises returned in the 1980s with the “pulling away of the threads” of
regulation.[50]
Weissman agrees with Stiglitz that the “most important effect” of
Glass–Steagall “repeal” was to “change the culture of commercial banking to
emulate Wall Street's high-risk speculative betting approach.”[51]
Legislative history of the Glass–Steagall Act
Main article: Banking Act of 1933
The article on
the 1933 Banking Act describes the legislative
history of that Act, including the Glass–Steagall provisions separating
commercial and investment banking. As described in that article, between 1930
and 1932 Senator Carter Glass (D-VA) introduced several versions of a bill (known
in each version as the Glass bill) to regulate or prohibit the combination of
commercial and investment banking and to establish other reforms (except
deposit insurance) similar to the final provisions of the 1933 Banking Act.[15]
On June 16, 1933, President Roosevelt signed the bill into law. Glass
originally introduced his banking reform bill in January 1932. It received
extensive critiques and comments from bankers, economists, and the Federal
Reserve Board. It passed the Senate in February 1932, but the House adjourned
before coming to a decision. The Senate passed a version of the Glass bill that
would have required commercial banks to eliminate their securities affiliates.[16]
The final Glass–Steagall provisions contained in the 1933 Banking Act reduced
from five years to one year the period in which commercial banks were required
to eliminate such affiliations.[17]
Although the deposit insurance provisions of the 1933 Banking Act were very
controversial, and drew veto threats from President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, President
Roosevelt supported the Glass–Steagall provisions separating commercial and
investment banking, and Representative Steagall included those provisions in
his House bill that differed from Senator Glass’s Senate bill primarily in its
deposit insurance provisions.[18]
Steagall insisted on protecting small banks while Glass felt that small banks
was the weakness to U.S. banking.As described in the 1933 Banking Act article, many accounts of the Act identify the Pecora Investigation as important in leading to the Act, particularly its Glass–Steagall provisions, becoming law.[19] While supporters of the Glass–Steagall separation of commercial and investment banking cite the Pecora Investigation as supporting that separation,[20] Glass–Steagall critics have argued that the evidence from the Pecora Investigation did not support the separation of commercial and investment banking.[21]
This source states that Senator Glass proposed many versions of his bill to Congress known as the Glass Bills in the two years prior to the Glass-Steagall Act being passed. It also includes how the deposit insurance provisions of the bill were very controversial at the time, which almost led to the rejection of the bill once again.
The previous Glass Bills before the final revision all had similar goals and brought up the same objectives which were to separate commercial from investment banking, bring more banking activities under Federal Reserve supervision and to allow branch banking. In May 1933 Steagall’s addition of allowing state chartered banks to receive federal deposit insurance and shortening the time in which banks needed to eliminate securities affiliates to one year was known as the driving force of what helped the Glass-Steagall act to be signed into law.
The Glass–Steagall provisions separating
commercial and investment banking
Main article: Glass–Steagall:
legislation, limits and loopholes
The
Glass–Steagall separation of commercial and investment banking was in four
sections of the 1933 Banking Act (sections 16, 20, 21, and 32).[1]
The Banking Act of 1935 clarified the 1933
legislation and resolved inconsistencies in it. Together, they prevented commercial
Federal Reserve member banks from:- dealing in
non-governmental securities for customers
- investing
in non-investment grade securities for themselves
- underwriting
or distributing non-governmental securities
- affiliating
(or sharing employees) with companies involved in such activities
The law gave banks one year after the law was passed on June 16, 1933 to decide whether they would be a commercial bank or an investment bank. Only 10 percent of a commercial bank's income could stem from securities. One exception to this rule was that commercial banks could underwrite government issued bonds.
There were several “loopholes” that regulators and financial firms were able to exploit during the lifetime of Glass-Steagall restrictions. Aside from the Section 21 prohibition on securities firms taking deposits, neither savings and loans nor state charted banks that did not belong to the Federal Reserve System were restricted by Glass-Steagall. Glass-Steagall also did not prevent securities firms from owning such institutions. S&Ls and securities firms took advantage of these loopholes starting in the 1960s to create products and affiliated companies that chipped away at commercial banks' deposit and lending businesses.
While permitting affiliations between securities firms and companies other than Federal Reserve member banks, Glass-Steagall distinguished between what a Federal Reserve member bank could do directly and what an affiliate could do. Whereas a Federal Reserve member bank could not buy, sell, underwrite, or deal in any security except as specifically permitted by Section 16, such a bank could affiliate with a company so long as that company was not “engaged principally” in such activities. Starting in 1987, the Federal Reserve Board interpreted this to mean a member bank could affiliate with a securities firm so long as that firm was not “engaged principally” in securities activities prohibited for a bank by Section 16. By the time the GLBA repealed the Glass-Steagall affiliation restrictions, the Federal Reserve Board had interpreted this “loophole” in those restrictions to mean a banking company (Citigroup, as owner of Citibank) could acquire one of the world’s largest securities firms (Salomon Smith Barney), as described in the article Glass–Steagall: decline.
By defining commercial banks as banks that take in deposits and make loans and investment banks as banks that underwrite and deal with securities the Glass Steagall act explained the separation of banks by stating that commercial banks could not deal with securities and investment banks could not own commercial banks or have close connections with them. With the exception of commercial banks being allowed to underwrite government issued bonds, commercial banks could only have ten percent of their income come from securities.
The Glass Steagall Legislation page specifies that only Federal Reserve member banks were affected by the provisions which according to secondary sources the act “applied direct prohibitions to the activities of certain commercial banks.
Glass–Steagall decline & effective repeal
Main article: Glass–Steagall: decline
It was not until
during 1933 that the separation of commercial bank and investment bank was
considered controversial. There was a belief that the separation would lead to
a healthier financial system.[22]
Later on, over the years the separation became controversial. By 1935 Senator
Glass himself attempted to “repeal” the prohibition on direct bank underwriting
by permitting a limited amount of bank underwriting of corporate debt.In the 1960s the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency issued aggressive interpretations of Glass-Steagall to permit national banks to engage in certain securities activities. Although most of these interpretations were overturned by court decisions, by the late 1970s bank regulators began issuing Glass-Steagall interpretations that were upheld by courts and that permitted banks and their affiliates to engage in an increasing variety and amount of securities activities. Starting in the 1960s banks and non-banks developed financial products that blurred the distinction between banking and securities products, as they increasingly competed with each other.
Separately, starting in the 1980s Congress debated bills to repeal Glass-Steagall’s affiliation provisions (Sections 20 and 32). In 1999 the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act repealed those provisions.
These and other developments are described in detail in the main article, Glass–Steagall: decline, under the following topic headings:
- Glass–Steagall
developments from 1935 to 1991
- Senator
Glass’s “repeal” effort
- Comptroller
Saxon’s Glass–Steagall interpretations
- 1966
to 1980 developments
- Increasing
competitive pressures for commercial banks
- Limited
congressional and regulatory developments
- Reagan
Administration developments
- State
non-member bank and nonbank bank “loopholes”
- Legislative
response
- International
competitiveness debate
- 1987
status of Glass–Steagall debate
- Section
20 affiliates
- Greenspan-led
Federal Reserve Board
- 1991
Congressional action and “firewalls”
- 1980s
and 1990s bank product developments
- Securitization,
CDOs, and “subprime” credit
- ABCP
conduits and SIVs
- OTC
derivatives, including credit default swaps
- Glass–Steagall
development from 1995 to Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act
- Leach
and Rubin support for Glass–Steagall “repeal”; need to address “market
realities”
- Status
of arguments from 1980s
- Failed
1995 Leach bill; expansion of Section 20 affiliate activities; merger of
Travelers and Citicorp
- 1997-98
legislative developments: commercial affiliations and Community
Reinvestment Act
- 1999
Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, eliminating
legal barriers between commercial banks, investment banks, securities
firms, and insurance companies
One of the most significant weakness of the act was the restrictions put on the separation of the investment and commercial banking, it prohibited the bank underwriting. Due to the restrictions put on banks for underwriting securities, some banks could not keep up with their competition, so a repeal for the act was put on. The repeal included many things but the most important was the repeal of separation of investment and commercial banking and the limited of underwriting securities.
That an appeal was necessary because banks were losing their competition, also by allowing banks to underwrite securities, it would allow to create a better relationship with customers and help maintain a customer loyalty to the bank. Also, by having investment and banking activities operate in the same institution, it would make the industry more credible because of diversification.
Aftermath of repeal
Main article: Glass–Steagall: Aftermath of repeal
Because the
Federal Reserve’s interpretations of Glass–Steagall Sections 20 and 32 had
weakened those restrictions, commentators did not find much significance in the
repeal of those sections. Instead, the five year anniversary of their repeal
was marked by numerous sources explaining that the GLBA had not significantly
changed the market structure of the banking and securities industries. More
significant changes had occurred during the 1990s when commercial banking firms
had gained a significant role in securities markets through “Section 20
affiliates.”After the financial crisis of 2007–08, however, many commentators argued that the repeal of Sections 20 and 32 had played an important role in leading to the crisis. Other commentators argued that the repeal had helped end, or mitigate, the crisis.
The main article on this subject, Glass–Steagall: Aftermath of repeal, has sections on:
- Commentator response to
Section 20 and 32 repeal
- Financial industry
developments after repeal of Sections 20 and 32
- Glass–Steagall “repeal” and
the financial crisis
Glass Steagall in post-financial crisis reform
debate
Main article: Glass–Steagall in
post-financial crisis reform debate
Following the
financial crisis of 2007-08, legislators unsuccessfully tried to reinstate
Glass–Steagall Sections 20 and 32 as part of the Dodd–Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Currently, bills are
pending in United States Congress that would revise
banking law regulation based on Glass–Steagall inspired principles. Both in the
United States and elsewhere banking reforms have been proposed that also refer
to Glass–Steagall principles. These proposals raise issues that were addressed
during the long Glass–Steagall debate in the United States, including issues of
“ring fending” commercial banking operations and “narrow banking” proposals
that would sharply reduce the permitted activities of commercial banks.Please see the main article, Glass–Steagall in post-financial crisis reform debate, for information about the following topics:
- Failed
2009-10 efforts to restore Glass–Steagall Sections 20 and 32 as part of
Dodd–Frank
- Post-2010
efforts to enact Glass–Steagall inspired financial reform legislation
- Volcker
Rule ban on proprietary trading as Glass–Steagall lite
- Further
financial reform proposals that refer to Glass–Steagall
- UK
and EU “ring fencing” proposals
- Similar
issues debated in connection with Glass–Steagall and “firewalls”
- Limited
purpose banking and narrow banking
- Wholesale
financial institutions in Glass–Steagall reform debate
- Glass–Steagall
references in reform proposal debate
(a) For the purpose of this section - (1) the
term "public official" means Member of Congress, Delegate, or
Resident Commissioner, either before or after such official has qualified, or
an officer or employee or person acting for or on behalf of the United States,
or any department, agency or branch of Government thereof, including the
District of Columbia, in any official function, under or by authority of any such
department, agency, or branch of Government, or a juror; (2) the term
"person who has been selected to be a public official" means any
person who has been nominated or appointed to be a public official, or has been
officially informed that such person will be so nominated or appointed; and (3)
the term "official act" means any decision or action on any question,
matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be
pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such
official's official capacity, or in such official's place of trust or profit.
(b) Whoever - (1) directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers or promises
anything of value to any public official or person who has been selected to be
a public official, or offers or promises any public official or any person who
has been selected to be a public official to give anything of value to any
other person or entity, with intent - (A) to influence any official act; or (B)
to influence such public official or person who has been selected to be a
public official to commit or aid in committing, or collude in, or allow, any
fraud, or make opportunity for the commission of any fraud, on the United
States; or (C) to induce such public official or such person who has been
selected to be a public official to do or omit to do any act in violation of
the lawful duty of such official or person; (2) being a public official or
person selected to be a public official, directly or indirectly, corruptly
demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of
value personally or for any other person or entity, in return for: (A) being
influenced in the performance of any official act; (B) being influenced to
commit or aid in committing, or to collude in, or allow, any fraud, or make
opportunity for the commission of any fraud, on the United States; or (C) being
induced to do or omit to do any act in violation of the official duty of such
official or person; (3) directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers, or
promises anything of value to any person, or offers or promises such person to
give anything of value to any other person or entity, with intent to influence
the testimony under oath or affirmation of such first-mentioned person as a
witness upon a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, before any court, any
committee of either House or both Houses of Congress, or any agency,
commission, or officer authorized by the laws of the United States to hear
evidence or take testimony, or with intent to influence such person to absent
himself therefrom; (4) directly or indirectly, corruptly demands, seeks,
receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally
or for any other person or entity in return for being influenced in testimony under
oath or affirmation as a witness upon any such trial, hearing, or other
proceeding, or in return for absenting himself therefrom; shall be fined under
this title or not more than three times the monetary equivalent of the thing of
value, whichever is greater, or imprisoned for not more than fifteen years, or
both, and may be disqualified from holding any office of honor, trust, or
profit under the United States. (c) Whoever - (1) otherwise than as provided by
law for the proper discharge of official duty - (A) directly or indirectly
gives, offers, or promises anything of value to any public official, former
public official, or person selected to be a public official, for or because of
any official act performed or to be performed by such public official, former
public official, or person selected to be a public official; or (B) being a
public official, former public official, or person selected to be a public
official, otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of
official duty, directly or indirectly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or
agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally for or because of any
official act performed or to be performed by such official or person; (2)
directly or indirectly, gives, offers, or promises anything of value to any
person, for or because of the testimony under oath or affirmation given or to
be given by such person as a witness upon a trial, hearing, or other
proceeding, before any court, any committee of either House or both Houses of
Congress, or any agency, commission, or officer authorized by the laws of the
United States to hear evidence or take testimony, or for or because of such
person's absence therefrom; (3) directly or indirectly, demands, seeks,
receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally
for or because of the testimony under oath or affirmation given or to be given
by such person as a witness upon any such trial, hearing, or other proceeding,
or for or because of such person's absence therefrom; shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both. (d) Paragraphs (3)
and (4) of subsection (b) and paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (c) shall
not be construed to prohibit the payment or receipt of witness fees provided by
law, or the payment, by the party upon whose behalf a witness is called and
receipt by a witness, of the reasonable cost of travel and subsistence incurred
and the reasonable value of time lost in attendance at any such trial, hearing,
or proceeding, or in the case of expert witnesses, a reasonable fee for time
spent in the preparation of such opinion, and in appearing and testifying. (e)
The offenses and penalties prescribed in this section are separate from and in
addition to those prescribed in sections 1503, 1504, and 1505 of this title. -
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Search 18 U.S.C. § 201 : US Code - Section 201:
Bribery of public officials and witnesses - See more at: http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/uscode/18/I/11/201#sthash.6s8cNBvj.dpuf
