How and
Why the Government Manipulated the Media at Waco
By
Anthony Gregory
Note:
The following is an excerpt from Anthony Gregory’s forthcoming e-publication, “God Help Us, We Want The Press”: The 1993
Waco Disaster and Government -Media Relations. If you want to be notified
about it when it’s ready and available, please drop me a line.
Well
before February 28, 1993, when the national press first showed an interest in
Waco, the ATF showed an interest in the national press. The Bureau had
publicity problems. The Bureau had a long history, originating during the 1791 Whisky
Rebellion, gaining notoriety during 1920s alcohol Prohibition, and eventually
coming to regulate firearms and enforce tobacco taxes in the 1940s, ‘50s, and
‘60s. Throughout the 1980s, it had a questionable reputation as a rogue agency
with inadequate oversight and was targeted for elimination by President Ronald
Reagan. Reagan and others who did not like the agency eventually decided that
abolishing it might open the door to something worse.[1][1]
Shortly
before the Waco raid, the agency’s public image had hit an especially low
point. Back in October of 1992, some African American agents accused the agency
of discrimination at a House of Representatives subcommittee meeting – specifically
claiming that their superiors assigned them to more dangerous jobs than their
white counterparts and denied denied the same opportunities to job promotion as
whites received. They filed suit. These allegations of racism were not the end.
Female workers from the ATF had also made allegations of sexual harassment, and
said they faced retaliatory punishment for voicing their complaints. The ATF
announced that it would launch an investigation as a result, two months before
the assault at Mount Carmel.[2][2] A couple of CBS’ 60 Minutes exposés
had focused on the harassment charges, including one before the Waco raid and
one a month after in which a reporter found, “Almost all the agents we talked
to said they believe the initial attack on that cult in Waco was a publicity
stunt – the main goal of which was to improve ATF’s tarnished image.”[3][3] This would explain the codename of the raid,
Operation Showtime. [4][4]
Meanwhile,
the local newspaper, The Waco Tribune-Herald, was preparing a seven-part
series entitled “the Sinful Messiah” on the Branch Davidians, mostly based on
accounts from defected sect members.[5][5] The series demonized Koresh and the
Davidians, and in their investigation for the piece, editors of the Herald came
to the conclusion that the sect was beyond eccentric, but rather genuinely
dangerous, and worthy of law enforcement and public attention. Bob Lott, editor
of the newspaper, said a day after the initial assault that their story
“contained a lot of information that the public ought to know. We decided to
let the public know about this menace in our backyard.”[6][6]
The
ATF, however, did not want the Herald to print the articles before the
siege began, because it might stir up attention and somehow spoil the raid. At
the ATF’s request, the Herald delayed publication for about a month, and
then decided finally to print it – giving the ATF one day’s notice.[7][7] The ATF, planning at first to attack on
March 1, later said they moved the assault one day back because of the Herald
article, and that doing so was no major inconvenience.[8][8]
When
the first piece in the “Sinful Messiah” series came out on the morning of
February 27, readers got the first glimpse of an image of the Davidians, and
especially David Koresh, that would persist and dominate during the length of
the siege and its news coverage:
“[David
Koresh] has dimples, claims a ninth-grade education, married his legal wife
when she was 14, enjoys a beer now and then, plays a mean guitar, reportedly
packs a 9mm Glock and keeps an arsenal of military assault rifles, and
willingly admits that he is a sinner without equal.”[9][9]
The piece went on to make some statements and
accusations that also colored public perception of Koresh and his followers,
for the rest of the standoff and to this day. It said that authorities “know
the cult has weapons and plenty of them” and took defected sect member Marc
Breault’s word that Koresh “abused children physically and psychologically” and
even hit babies “until their bottoms bled.”[10][10]
If the ATF did not want an untimely
publication of the Waco Tribune-Herald’s piece to interfere with the
success of their raid, they sure did not mind the newspaper’s presence. An ATF
agent called the newspaper, and though not revealing the agency’s exact plans
at least ensured, in editor Bob Lott’s words, that the newspaper got “wind that
something was going to happen.” ABC and NBC also said later that the ATF told
them to be there for the raid, and so they were. The assignment editor for ABC’s Dallas
affiliate, Gary Nichols, later confided that Sharon Wheeler, a public
information officer for the ATF, called and told him, “we have something big
going down.” Other press officials from local television stations also arrived
at the scene, prompted by the Waco Tribune-Herald edition the morning
before, which they said made them think something would happen there soon. [11][11] Sharon Wheeler later admitted in testimony
that she called the media contacts, telling them to be at the scene, but denied
that it had anything to do with publicity.[12][12]
And
so the stage was set for Operation Showtime. The ATF planned to raid the
Branch Davidian home to search for weapons and arrest Koresh. The ATF could
have easily accomplished these two goals without military arsenal or intense
publicity. Instead they chose to carry out a lavish operation while press
officials from ABC, NBC, and the Waco Tribune-Herald would be there to watch, just in case ATF
pulled the raid off in a successful performance of such skill, heroism, and
bravery as to redeem their public image. They targeted a “cult,” who also had a pubic image,
conveniently tarnished in the local daily newspaper the morning before.
Once
the raid transformed from an orchestrated publicity stunt into a catastrophe,
the ATF became hostile toward the press. Authorities asked some reporters to
move away or outright leave the scene. According to Jim Long, program director
of television studio KGBS, reporters from his station followed these orders
without hesitation: “All they had to do was tell us to leave. What did we do?
We left. How could we hinder the process?”[13][13] Eleven reporters later gave similar
accounts of ATF hostility once the raid went awry.[14][14] Sometimes, officials even used violence.
ATF agents physically and verbally assaulted KWTX-TV cameraman Dan Mulloney
while he was trying to leave the scene, nearly knocking him to the ground.[15][15]
Not
only did ATF agents begin to vent their anger at the press, some of them even
pinned blame on the media for the failure of the raid. At first, ambiguous
suspicion arose that the Waco Tribune-Herald ultimately caused the ATF’s
failure. A relative of an injured agent went so far as to say, “It’s not
responsible journalism. It’s murder. [Herald editor Bob Lott] pulled the
trigger just as sure as those people in the compound did.” Officially, the
agency had a more ambivalent opinion: ATF spokeswoman Sharon Wheeler – who had
told the reporters to be at the scene in the first place – declared that the
bureau had no official qualms with the reporting.[16][16] In spite of this “official” position, the
ATF were unhappy with the press enough by March 2, two days after the raid, to
order the press to move several miles away from the scene.[17][17] For the duration of the siege up until its
deadly end, reporters would not get closer than 6,000 feet to the subject of
their reporting.[18][18]
Reporters
also quickly lost the direct contact with Davidians inside that they had for
the first few days of the standoff. On the day of the initial assault, David
Koresh conducted an interview with CNN that lasted twenty minutes. That same
day, he also spoke with A Current Affair, a television tabloid.[19][19] On the second day of the standoff, Koresh
spoke on the radio and presented his angle on the situation, complete with
religious fervor.[20][20] Officials said they allowed Koresh these
privileges of media access in exchange for his promise that he would come out
on March 2. When Koresh reneged on this deal, saying that God told him to wait
longer, the government officials lost patience and cut him off from the press.[21][21] This isolation from the media lasted the
rest of the siege. The government now had the upper hand in media coverage. The
Davidians on the other hand could not get their story out to the world, to
explain their perspective to the court of public opinion, for the remainder of
the seven-week standoff. Frustrated, the Branch Davidians gave the world a
message on March 9 by hanging a banner outside a window, visible to reporters
and photographers who by this point began using super high quality lenses to
see the standoff from far away. The banner read, “God Help Us. We Want the
Press.”[22][22] The media could probably assume the
general meaning from the message, but as implied in the message itself,
journalists could not understand the intricacies of the message’s expressed
desire.
The
FBI found amusing neither the Davidians’ obsession with the media, nor the
media’s obsession with the Davidians.
FBI official Bob Ricks said on March 10 that attempts of the media to
contact the Davidians inside diverted the negotiation process “from trying to
gain release of all those inside to Mr. Koresh’s attempts to gain access to the
media.” He called this “counterproductive,” and explained that the FBI “found
that [Koresh] loves the attention. If he sees he can get the attention of the
media, the longer he will hold out.”[23][23]
As
the standoff continued and became more embarrassing, the FBI continued to keep
the press at a distance from the scene, even when new developments emerged.
When several Davidians left the building under siege, the New York Times had
to admit its inability to describe the events well: “It was difficult for
reporters to determine what was happening inside the compound, because the
Federal authorities cut off outside lines and prevented the four adults who had
come out from being interviewed.” The Davidians hung a third banner on March
14, which read, “F.B.I. broke negotiations. We want press.” The New York
Times again admitted its limited comprehension: “It was unclear what
prompted the message.”[24][24] Perhaps it was unclear to the Times because
as a member of the press, they were not getting the whole story – just as the
banner implied. And perhaps they were not allowed the whole story because the
F.B.I. broke negotiations.
Through
the middle of March the FBI maintained that they wanted to limit coverage of
the event because Koresh wanted publicity – presumably an ignoble goal for
religious extremists, if not the ATF. [25][25] FBI
agent Bob Ricks explained simply that they would deny Koresh access to the
press “until [they] are sure he has come out.”[26][26] In the following few days, Koresh
reportedly read news accounts that he considered unfair, and wanted desperately
to have a chance to give his perspective. Ricks held his ground, reiterating
that “if [Koresh] wants it told his way, he’ll have to come out.”[27][27] What the government initially planned as
a mechanism for winning over the hearts and minds of America’s television
enthusiasts had by now become a tool for luring Koresh out, which would,
incidentally, serve the initial purpose as well.
Not only did the FBI want the press kept away
from the Davidians, they also wanted to silence whistleblowers who might give
accounts of the raid inconsistent with the government’s official story. Some
ATF agents began to tell the press anonymously that the agency had
inappropriately given certain media representatives information about the raid
before it began. Such allegations would make it hard for other agents to blame
the press for ruining the assault, if the government asked the press to be
there in the first place. ATF and FBI leaders also did not want their employees
criticizing each other’s agencies. On March 12, FBI Directior William Sessions
and ATF Director Stephen Higgins delivered a joint statement voicing their
unease with “unnamed agents speaking to the media about aspects of both
operations and critical of the other agency.”[28][28] On March 15, concern about
whistleblowers came from up top, when Washington D.C. sent a memo to agents
warning them that those who talked to the public about what happened would risk
being fired, punished, or even prosecuted. Because of this, all accounts from
agents to the press critical of the way the government handled the raid – and
such accounts did exist – were anonymous.[29][29] This might have made their words less
credible to some than those of the named government approved operatives
mouthing official stories.
As
government-media relations became increasingly important to authorities, the Waco
Tribune-Herald controversy also persisted. ATF agent John Risenhoover,
wounded in the initial attack, began accusing the Herald of
responsibility for the raid’s failure, implicating the newspaper in tipping off
the sect before the assault. On March 17, he and others officially filed suit,
blaming the Herald for leaking information to the Davidians because they
“wanted a conflict that would make a good news story.” Editor Bob Lott
responded to the allegations by saying, “The injuries to Agent Risenhoover and
the deaths and injuries to others are regrettable. But they were not caused by
this paper.” The ATF itself was not officially behind the suit; Risenhoover’s
superior said, “We’re unhappy with the timing of the suit, obviously, because
there is an ongoing criminal investigation…. We asked them not to file the
suit, but we could not order them [not] to.” [30][30] Risenhoover also complained that the Herald
promised not to publish the piece, but did so anyway. The Herald and
the ATF said no such promise had been made.[31][31] Other agents may have also blamed the
newspaper, but perhaps vented their anger in other ways. FBI agents in a tank
flattened a truck belonging to the newspaper, but claimed they did so
accidentally. Bob Ricks explained: “We are not professional tank drivers. We
are FBI agents who are driving those vehicles.”[32][32]
As
the standoff ensued, the press continued to get most of their information from
the government. The FBI conducted daily press conferences, in effect holding a
monopoly on sources of information for the media and the public. These
conferences were at least as much used as a weapon against David Koresh as they
were used to portray the FBI in a manner favorable to the agency. Hodding
Carter, a State Department official who had acted as the government’s voice
during the Iran hostage crisis, told reporters, “Almost everything [said at the
press conferences have] more to do with that one-person public [Koresh] than
with the larger public.”[33][33]
On
March 28, the New York Times published a powerful article, outlining
many aspects of government incompetence and negligence and inconsistencies in
government claims. Many of the sources were anonymous agents who spoke under
anonymity out of fear of being harassed by the government.[34][34] In spite of the fact that the government had
kept the press away from the Davidians, and had threatened their own agents to
keep them away from the press, some disturbing facts came out.
In
the daily press conferences that followed, reporters mainly asked questions
about issues brought up in the March 28 article, or arising from a general
skepticism that began to grow toward the end of the standoff. Specifically, the
questions pertained to whether the ATF had initiated a raid even though they
knew that Koresh was aware it would happen – a concern brought up in the March
28 Times piece. Around the same time that authorities became heavily and
detectably annoyed with the standoff, they also revealed a loss of patience
with the press, who became increasingly skeptical of the government. On
Saturday, April 11, ten nine days before the fire, ATF intelligence chief and press
conference regular David Troy stopped holding the meetings with reporters
altogether.[35][35] Not until the April 19 fire would the agency
again show interest in talking with the press.
[36][1] Stephen Labaton, “Saved from
Extinction, New Agency Faces Peril,” Dallas Morning News, March 4, 1993.
[38][3] “Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
and Harassment; Female ATF Agents Say Sexual Harassment within the Agency is
Rampant and Unchecked,” CBS News Transcripts, 60 Minutes, May 23, 1993,
cited in James Bovard, “Feeling Your Pain”: The
Explosion of Government Power and Abuse in the Clinton-Gore Years (Palgrave: New York, 2000),
269.
[39][4] Dick J. Reavis, The Ashes
of Waco: An Investigation (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 33; James
D. Tabor and Eugene V. Gallagher, Why Waco: Cults and Religious Freedom in
America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 103. The
unofficial codename, used by most ATF officials, was “Operation Showtime.” The
official codename was strangely “Operation Trojan Horse.” Agents thought about
the raid in terms of the unofficial name, yelling “showtime!” as the raid
began.
[41][6] Bill Carter, “After Gunfire
Dies Down, Questions Arise on Newspaper’s Role,” New York Times, March
2, 1993.
[44][9] Waco-Tribune Herald,
February 27, 1993, reprinted in San Francisco Chronicle, March 1, 1993.
[46][11] “After Gunfire Dies Down,
Questions Arise on Newspaper’s Role,” New York Times, March 2, 1993.
[48][13] Terrence Stutz, “Cult
Displays Banner Seeking Talk with Rights Group,” Dallas Morning News,
March 11, 1993.
[49][14] Stephen Labaton and Sam Howe
Verhovek, “U.S. Agents Say Fatal Flaws Doomed Raid on Waco Cult,” New York
Times, March 28, 1993.
[50][15] Described in Carol
Moore, The Davidian Massacre: Disturbing Questions About Waco Which Must Be
Answered (Legacy Communications: Franklin, Tennessee, 1995), 149, citing trial transcripts.
Actual footage of the assault, recorded on Mulloney’s camera, can be seen in Waco:
the New Revelation, prod. Rick Van Vleet, Stephen M. Novak, Michael
McNulty, dir. Jason Van Vleet, MGA Films, 1999, videocassette.
[51][16] “After Gunfire Dies Down,
Questions Arise on Newspaper’s Role,” New York Times, March 2, 1993.
[52][17] Don Terry, “Shootout in
Texas Goes on After Cult Chief’s Broadcast,” New York Times, March 3,
1993.
[54][19] “After Gunfire Dies Down,
Questions Arise on Newspaper’s Role,” New York Times, March 2, 1993.
[56][21] Lee Hancock and George
Kuempel, “U.S. Agents Seem Ready for Long Wait,” Dallas Morning News,
March 4, 1993.
[57][22] George Kuemple, “McLennan
Sheriff Joins Talks with Cult Leader,” Dallas Morning News, March 10,
1993.
[58][23] David McLemore, “Agents
Claim Control: Man Arrested Outside Cult Site,” Dallas Morning News,
March 11, 1993.
[59][24] Robert Reinhold, “Members of
Texas Sect Hint Resolve is Weakening,” New York Times, March 15, 1993.
[61][26] Todd Copilevitz, “Up to 20
in Cult Want to Leave, FBI Agent Says,” Dallas Morning News, March 18,
1993.
[62][27] Victoria Lee and Lee
Hancock, “2 Leave Sect Compound; Koresh Talks to Agents,” Dallas Morning
News, March 20, 1993.
[63][28] Bruce Nichols, “Lawyers
Complain About Secrecy on U.S. Documents About Cult,” Dallas Morning News,
March 13, 1993.
[64][29] Stephen Labaton and Sam Howe
Verhovek, “U.S. Agents Say Fatal Flaws Doomed Raid on Waco Cult,” New York
Times, March 28, 1993.
[66][31] Sam Howe Verhovek, “Agent
Injured by Cult Gunfire Blames Texas Newspaper in Lawsuit,” New York Times,
March 18, 1993.
[67][32] Christy Hoppe, “FBI
Challenges Koresh to Let Followers Leave,” Dallas Morning News, March
19, 1993.
[68][33] Victoria Lee, “Between the
Lines: FBI Uses Briefings As Tactical Weapons,” Dallas Morning News,
March 25, 1993.
[69][34] Stephen Labaton and Sam Howe
Verhovek, “U.S. Agents Say Fatal Flaws Doomed Raid on Waco Cult,” New York
Times, March 28, 1993.
[70][35] Victoria Lee, “Koresh
Threatens to Smite His Enemies,” Dallas Morning News, April 11, 1993.
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