Fairly well written explaination of the situation we are facing.

emailed to me... Someone sure put some work into this.
by Lee Brobst

PLIGHT OF THE LAND
RETURN TO A REPUBLIC

A TERRITORY VERSUS THE TERRITORY1

The Supreme Court ruling on the property clause of Art. IV. Sect. 3, cl.2 stated: Literally, the word “territory”, as used, signifies property, since the language is not “territory or property”, but “territory or other property.” There arises and evident difference between the words “the territory” and “a territory” of the United States. The former merely designates a particular part or parts of the earth’s surface-the imperially extensive holdings of the Nation; the latter is a governmental subdivision which happened to be called a “territory” but which quite as well could have been called a “colony” . . . “province”. . . “A territory, under the Constitution and laws of United States is an inchoate state’, quoting Ex parte Morgan D.C. 20 Fed 298, 305. O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 US 516 (1933). (Italics in original) The. An article which particularizes the subject spoken of. “Grammatical niceties should not be resorted to without necessity; but it would be extending liberality to an unwarrantable length to confound the articles ‘a’ and ‘the’. The most unlettered persons understand that ‘a’ is indefinite, but ‘the’ refers to a certain object.” Black’s Law Dict. 5th ed. Note: an inchoate state is an incomplete state - - - it has no charter of incorporation, hence no borders defined as it possess no physical reality existing as a governmental subdivision which is considered other property of the United States in the spirit of the law under Art. IV Sec. 3 cl.2. According to Black’s Law Dict. 5th ed., a “governmental subdivision is an agency created to carry out a governmental purpose or function. See also Administrative agency; governmental agency.” It is a well established principle of law that the federal “legislation applies only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States unless a contrary intent appears Caha v. United States 152 US 211, 215 (1894); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. 213 US 347 (1909);United States v. Bowman 260 US 94, 97 (1922); Blackmer v. United States 284 US 421, 437 (1932). Take note the Court stated: “U.S citizens living abroad are not questions of international law, but of municipal law”; Foley Bros. v. Filardo 336 US 281, 285 (1949); United States v. Spelar 338 US 217, 222, (1949); and United States v. First National City Bank 321 F. 2d 14, 23, 2d Cir., (1963). All these cases deal with “the territory” of United States. These decisions were rendered where there was evidence of a contract, corporate charter, or municipal law that was the subject matter of the cases. In other words, public policy was not involved in those contracts and municipal law. The terms and conditions were spelled out on the documents in a one on one basis. The Court also noted in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co that territorial law is only prima facie evidence of law. In other words, all territorial law is voluntary subject to a higher form of evidence to the contrary. A person must be aware that most of the following federal appellate courts decisions fall within “a territorial” jurisdiction. see McKeal v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 722 F.2d "582, 589 (9th Cir., 1983) (holding the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act as territorial); Meredith v. United States, 330 F.2d 9, 11 (9th Cir., 1964) (holding the Federal Torts Claims Act as territorial); United States v. Cotroni, 527 F.2d 708, 711 (2nd Cir., 1975) (holding federal wiretap laws as territorial); Stowe v. Devoy, 588 F.2d 336, 341 (2nd Cir., 1978); Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 607, 609 (3rd Cir., 1984) (holding federal age discrimination laws as territorial); Thomas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 745 F.2d 279, 281 (4th Cir., 1984) (holding same as Cleary, supra): United States v. Mitchell, 553 F. 2d 996, 1002 (5th Cir., 1977) (holding marine mammals protection act as territorial): Pfeiffer v. William Wrigley. Jr., Co., 755 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir., 1985) (holding age discrimination laws as territorial); Airline Stewards & Stewardesses Assn. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 267 F.2d 170, 175 (8th Cir., 1959) (holding Railway Labor Act as territorial); Zahourek v. Arthur Young and Co., 750 F.2d 827, 829 (10th Cir., 1984) (holding age discrimination laws as territorial); Commodities Futures Trading Comm. v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487,493 (D.C.C ir., 1984) (holding commission's subpoena power under federal law as territorial): Reyes v. Secretary of H.E.W., 476 F.2d 910,. 915 (D.C Cir., 1973) (holding administration of Social Security Act as territorial); and Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F.Supp. 385, 392 (S.D.N.Y., 1967) (holding securities act as territorial). [Bold emphasis added] There are no physical charters or contracts registered with the secretary of state’s office. Also there are no municipal laws involved in “a territorial” jurisdiction, only a presumption under the Erie RR v. Tompkins 304 US 64 doctrine that a person is subject to diversity of citizenship. Diversity exists when a person resides in one state subject to the jurisdiction of another state. In other words, a person lives in say California, but has volunteered to join a social security trust. That trust is an unincorporated association of federated states or inchoate states or state in “a territory” under Article IV Sec. 3 cl.2. Said situation is also called a “conflict of law” between Article IV Sec. 3 cl.2 (“a territory”) and Article IV Sec. 3 cl.1. (“the territory”) In other words, a conflict of law exists because of diversity. If a “person” wants their sovereignty along with its Constitutional Rights and not civil rights, all that a person has to do is create the evidence in law to destroy the social security trust that that “person” is a member thereof. It’s not easy to accomplish, it takes a lot of dedicated learning, but then anything worthwhile is not easy. “A territorial” jurisdiction falls under private international law where unilateral contracts are the rule as opposed to; “the territorial” law of bilateral contracts (Article IV Sec. 3 cl.1) that is the rule of law. The Social Security Act is the target of this writing because social security is an unincorporated association that is not a part of the municipal law of the United States or its headquarters would not be in Baltimore Maryland. The Social Security Administration comes under private international law and not municipal law therefore, within “a territorial” jurisdiction. i.e., Article IV Sec. 3 cl.2, and the (J)udicial (p)ower of amendment 11. The Verlinden case is a good example of how not to mix case law as evidenced above such as decisions describing “the territory” jurisdiction with decisions describing “a territory”. In Verlinden v. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 491 (1983), the court discussed the distinction between “jurisdictional statutes” and “the federal law under which an action arises for (j)udical (P)ower for Art. III purposes.” The Court recognized that pure jurisdictional statutes which seek to do nothing more than grant jurisdiction over a particular class of cases cannot support Art. III “arising under” jurisdiction. Particular class of cases meaning members of the social security trust, an unincorporated association. The words “arising under … laws of the United States” have chiefly been construed in cases involving not Article III directly, but the statutory grant of federal question jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and its predecessors, which is cast in the same language. It is universally acknowledged, however, that the statutory grant does not exhaust the constitutional power, Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 n.51 (1959); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 515 (1969); see National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 613-14 (1949) (Rutledge, J., concurring); Mishkin supra, at 160-63; Note on the effect of the Statutory Adoption of the Constitutional Language, Hart & Wechsler, supra, at 870; Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 3562 (1975). From Article III –Arising Under Jurisdiction 76 L.Ed 2d 831. It should be remembered when raising or defending against the assertion that a particular action is not within the scope of the "arising under" clause of Article III § 2, clause 1 that the question is not whether the "arising under" clause authorizes the action to be brought in the federal courts, but whether Congress is authorized by that clause to allow by statute for such a claim to be brought there. This distinction is particularly important when a suit is brought under the authority of the general federal question jurisdictional statute (28 USCS § 1331), since the jurisdiction provided by § 1331 is narrower than the jurisdiction Congress is empowered to give by the "arising under" clause. In Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria 76 L Ed 2d 81; 461 U.S. 480, 491 (1983), the court made note that the Court of Appeals decision it reversed concerning the scope of the "arising under" clause relied heavily on decisions construing § 1331, placing particular emphasis on the so called "well-pleaded complaint" rule, which provides for purposes of statutory "arising under" jurisdiction, that the federal question must appear on the face of a well-pleaded complaint and may not enter in anticipation of a defense. According to the Supreme Court, “the reliance on those decisions was misplaced. Thus, the case is a good example of the caution one should use in making sure that the cases being relied upon to answer jurisdictional questions are not discussing statutory jurisdiction when the question concerns Article III jurisdiction, or vice versa.” The reason given for this distinction is that there exists policy consideration i.e., an unincorporated association under Erie RR underlying the purpose of the jurisdictional statute that limit its application and which do not enter into the picture when construing the constitutional authorization for statutory federal question jurisdiction.” In other words, 14th amendment “persons” come within the preview of “a territorial” jurisdiction under Article IV Sec. 3 cl.2 that is governed by Article 1 legislative courts with its decisions based upon a public trust. Court decisions based upon a public trust cannot be used in a case that involves cases where the subject matter of the case involves a written contract, physical charter or municipal law or direct constitutional issues that involves Article III courts. The same is true in the reverse. Article III decisions cannot be used in cases involving the public trust. In other words, Article I legislative courts espouse rules and regulations that encompasses public policy under Erie RR v. Tompkins 304 US 64. Article I courts have jurisdiction over “citizen persons” of the unincorporated association under Article IV Sec. 3 cl.2, and Article I Sec. 8 cls. 3 and 9 to the Constitution to wit: 3. To regulate Commerce … among the several States … . [Bold emphasis added: 9. To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court, Are you beginning to see why the courts react like they do to the Gobbledegook that is entered into the courts. As noted in Article IV Sec. 3 cl.2, there is no charter of incorporation by HJR 192 of the newly created several federal states and just what its duties are, i.e., its intents and purposes; instead there is a resulting or implied (charitable) trust is formed by operation of law.2 In other words, Congress created the conditions for a resulting or implied trust with HJR 192. Under HJR 192, and Article IV Sec. 3 cl.2, public policy determined there is no separation of powers doctrine thus the Union of several states is nonexistent; instead there is a federation of inchoate states under private international law3 termed “a territory”. The courts take judicial notice of HJR 192, and the above Erie RR, and O’Donoghue cases and public policies view of the several states as a federation of states under the Constitution. “The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of States, or state governments as abstract political entities, or even for the benefit of public officials governing the States. To the contrary, the Constitution divides authority between the federal and state governments for the ‘protection’ of individuals.” New York v. U.S.,505 U.S. 144. (1992) When it comes to 14th amendment “persons”, there is a presumption that diversity of citizenship exists because that person is a beneficiary of the social security trust, thus “subject to” Article IV Sec. 3 cl.2 to create a “conflict of law”. In other words, a “person” is straddling the fence and must make a decision with evidence which law that person is subject to. Silence is consent under private international law, i.e., Article IV Sec. 3 cl.2 “persons” reside in “a territory” thus have no standing to quote the above New York v. U.S. case. The United States has no territorial jurisdiction over non-federally owned areas inside the territorial jurisdiction of the states in the American Union. The question becomes, what territorial jurisdiction are we talking about? When it comes to agencies of the United States government as mentioned above, there is only one territory and that is “a territory” of Article IV Sec. 3 cl.2. There are no states with boundary lines that are comprised of members of a private unincorporated association of 14th amendment “persons” that are beneficiaries to the social security charitable trust. In other words, they are members of the several inchoate states as noted in O’Donoghue that have no definitive borders as has the American Union of states under Article IV Sec. 3 cl.1.

Lee Brobst

Contact: www.orgsites.com/ca/waternow

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 Please take note: When it comes to public policy UNDER ARTICLE IV SECTION 3 CL.2 WITH THE DESTRUCTION OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS, WITH THE DIFFERENT LAW FORUMS SUCH AS THE COMMON LAW, ADMIRALTY-MARITIME, CIVIL LAW, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE LAW OF TRUSTS, LAW AS OPPOSED TO EQUITY HAVE BEEN ABOLISHED AND ARE NOW TREATED AS ONE AND THE SAME. THIS IS WHY IT IS SO DIFFICULT IN NOT ONLY UNDERSTANDING WHAT IS HAPPENING TO AMERICA BUT EVEN MORE DIFFICULT ISPUTTING IT ON PAPER. YOU THE READER, WILL NOTICE THAT I KEEP REPEATING ISSUES BECAUSE I WANT THE READER TO VIEW THE ISSUES OF LAW IN A DIFFERENT LIGHT HOPING THE READER WILL FIND A NITCH IN UNDERSTANDING. THE BIGGEST PROBLEM I HAVE IS DE-PROGRAMING PEOPLE FROM BAD MISINFORMATION. 2 Operation of law. This term expresses the manner in which rights, and sometimes liabilities, devolve upon a person by the mere application to the particular transaction of the established rules of law, without the act or co-operation of the party himself. Black’s Law Dict. 5th ed. 3 A State of the United States is not a "state" under international law since by its constitutional status it does not have capacity to conduct foreign relations. United States alone, not any of its constituent States, enjoys international sovereignty and nationhood. "In respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. As to such purposes the State does not exist." United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, (1937)