Friday, April 24, 2015

Freewill's school subject~ FICTION OF LAW

Well People, It's about time to wake up and smell the
coffee. What I am about to give you is nothing but
the truth from the courts and laws of the United
States. When you know what to look for you will find
it in the oddest places. Places that the ordinary man
would not expect to find it. Every one talks about
government being a corporation as cited in 28 USC
3002 (15). Every one complains when taken to court
where is the contract. All people argue these
contracts, whether implied, adhesion or what ever. So
there is a lot in common with all the arguments. Of
course when you go into court you most always lose
even when bringing in the law, regulations and court
cases that you feel supports your position.
For years now I have been trying to make people
understand that citizenship, of what ever government
nature, is what sucks you into being a taxpayer, or
requiring you to get whatever license is needed to
survive and being controlled by government
(corporation). How the government operates is by
Fiction of Law. A fiction of law is stated from
Lectric Law Library on the net as follows:


The assumption that a certain thing is true, and which gives to a person or thing a quality
which is not natural to it, and consequently establishes, a certain disposition, which,
without the fiction, would be repugnant to reason and to truth. It is an order of things
which does not exist, but which the law prescribes or authorizes. It differs from
presumption because it establishes as true, something which is false; whereas presumption
supplies the proof of something true.
The law never feigns what is impossible. Fiction is like art; it imitates nature, but never
disfigures it. It aids truth, but it ought never to destroy it. It may well suppose that what
was possible, but which does not exist; but it will never feign that what was impossible
actually is.
Fictions were invented by the Roman praetors who, not possessing the power to
abrogate the law, were nevertheless willing to derogate from it under the pretense of
doing equity. Fiction is the resource of weakness which, in order to obtain its object,
assumes as a fact what is known to be contrary to truth: when the legislator desires to
accomplish his object, he need not feign, he commands. Fictions of law owe their origin
to the legislative usurpations of the bench.
It is said that every fiction must be framed according to the rules of law, and that every
legal fiction must have equity for its object. To prevent their evil effects, they are not
allowed to be carried further than the reasons which introduced them necessarily require.
The law abounds in fictions. That an estate is in abeyance; the doctrine of remitter, by
which a party who has been disseised of his freehold and afterwards acquires a defective
title, is remitted to his former good title; that one thing done today, is considered as done
at a preceding time by the doctrine of relation; that because one thing is proved, another
shall be presumed to be true, which is the case in all presumptions; that the heir, executor,
and administrator stand by representation in the place of the deceased are all fictions of
law. "Our various introduction of John Doe and Richard Roe; our solemn process upon
disseisin by Hugh Hunt; our casually losing and finding a ship (which never was in Europe)
in the parish of St. Mary Le Bow, in the ward of Cheap; our trying the validity of a will by
an imaginary wager of five pounds; our imagining and compassing the king's death, by
giving information which may defeat an attack upon an enemy's settlement in the
antipodes; our charge of picking a pocket or forging a bill with force and arms; of
neglecting to repair a bridge, against the peace of the king, his crown and dignity are
circumstances, which, looked at by themselves, would convey an impression of no very
favorable nature, with respect to the wisdom of our jurisprudence."
disseisin by Hugh Hunt; our casually losing and finding a ship (which never was in Europe)
in the parish of St. Mary Le Bow, in the ward of Cheap; our trying the validity of a will by
an imaginary wager of five pounds; our imagining and compassing the king's death, by
giving information which may defeat an attack upon an enemy's settlement in the
antipodes; our charge of picking a pocket or forging a bill with force and arms; of
neglecting to repair a bridge, against the peace of the king, his crown and dignity are
circumstances, which, looked at by themselves, would convey an impression of no very
favorable nature, with respect to the wisdom of our jurisprudence."
Now notice that Assumption is the word used to
describe how fiction operates. The word presumption
is the opposite, see opening paragraph for this
sentence "It differs from presumption because it
establishes as true, something which is false;
whereas presumption supplies the proof of something
true."
Now lets use this material from Black's 3rd Edition Law book and a
case to wit:
Fiction. Derived from Fictio in Roman Law, a fiction is defined as a false averment on the
part of the Plaintiff which the defendant is not allowed to traverse, the object being to give
the court jurisdiction. Black's Law Dictionary 3rd Ed. (1969) Pg. 468; In the case of
"Willful failure to File," the Plaintiff and court invents the "fiction" that defendant is a
"taxpayer", A.K.A. "Person." Motions and briefs which rely on precepts of law will
thereafter be denied or found frivolous. This point was made clear in Roberts v.
Commissioner, 176 F 2d 221, 225 (9 C.A., 1949)
Now you know why all your arguments are frivolous.
You are a fiction and fictions have no constitutional
protection from encroachment on your unalienable
rights. What is this fiction that you are? This is a
list of words or phrases that describe a fiction,
remembering "fiction" is artificial in character,
PERSON, RESIDENT, U.S. CITIZEN, STATE CITIZEN, and
INDIVIDUAL.
I am using the full case as it is so important, not
only for the fact that I am writing on Fiction of
Law, but other parameters that I have written long
ago and that people poohpoohed
it as ridiculous as
it dealt with admiralty. I had showed where both
revenue and driving was maritime in nature and almost
everyone said I was way off base even though I had
shown, through Benedict on Admiralty, that licensing
and registering your car was in the nature of
maritime. So all revenue situations, Income tax and
Driving are in the admiralty jurisdiction because of
the maritime nature. That is why the courts will not
tell you the nature is maritime and the cause is that
you have violated your promise to perform under
fiction of law. Now you are going to say, oh no the
Informer is going off the deep end again. Well hear
these cases out and the Fiction of Law premise. Take
off the blinders you have had on so long and use the
brain that the Lord gave you. The Lord did say that
not all that have eyes to see will see and,
therefore, if you do not see you will forever be
doomed to the existence you have. I am going to bold,
in the case, to show how maritime is used whenever
you carry passengers for hire, be it boat, plane,
wagon, scooter, rickshaw or car. Do not lose sight of
the fact that you are a fiction and have contracted
with government when reading this case. Oh by the way
go to Find Law and search for Fiction of Law and have
a good time reading.
U.S. Supreme Court
ARCHAWSKI v. HANIOTI, 350 U.S. 532 (1956)
350 U.S. 532
ARCHAWSKI ET AL. v. HANIOTI.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT.
No. 351.
Argued March 5, 1956.
Decided April 9, 1956.
A libel in admiralty alleged that petitioners paid moneys to respondent for transportation
to Europe on respondent's vessel, and that respondent breached the contract by
abandonment of the voyage. The libel further alleged that respondent wrongfully
appropriated the passage money to his own use and committed other fraudulent acts.
Held: The cause of action alleged
Argued March 5, 1956.
Decided April 9, 1956.
A libel in admiralty alleged that petitioners paid moneys to respondent for transportation
to Europe on respondent's vessel, and that respondent breached the contract by
abandonment of the voyage. The libel further alleged that respondent wrongfully
appropriated the passage money to his own use and committed other fraudulent acts.
Held: The cause of action alleged
was within the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal District Court. Pp. 532536.
(a) The essential character of the libel as a claim for breach of a maritime contract was
not altered by the allegations of wrongfulness and fraud. Pp. 534535.
(b) So long as the claim asserted arises out of a maritime contract, the admiralty court
has jurisdiction over it. P. 535.
(c)Admiralty has jurisdiction even where a libel reads like indebitatus assumpsit at
common law, provided that the unjust enrichment arose out of the breach of a maritime
contract. Pp. 535536.
223 F.2d 406, reversed and remanded.
Harry D. Graham argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners.
Israel Convisser argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The sole question in the case is whether the cause of action alleged comes within the
admiralty jurisdiction of the District Court. The District Court held that this was an action
on a maritime contract, within the admiralty jurisdiction, 129 F. Supp. 410. The Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that the suit was in the nature of the [350 U.S. 532,
533] old common law indebitatus assumpsit for money had and received, based
upon the wrongful withholding of money. 223
F.2d 406. The case is here on a petition for certiorari which we granted, 350 U.S. 872,
because of the seeming conflict of that ruling with Krauss Bros. Co. v. Dimon S. S.
Corp., 290 U.S. 117, 124.1
The libel alleges that respondent, doing business in his own and in various trade names,
owned and controlled a passenger vessel, known as the City of Athens, and held out
that vessel as a common carrier of passengers for hire, and that petitioners paid
moneys for passage upon the vessel, scheduled for July 15, 1947, to Europe. A contract
for the transportation of passengers is a maritime contract within admiralty
jurisdiction.2 The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411. The allegations so far mentioned are
plainly sufficient to establish such a contract. The libel goes on to allege a breach of
that contract through an abandonment of the voyage. If this were all, it would be plain that
petitioners stated a claim for breach of a maritime contract. But the libel further alleges
that the sums paid by petitioners as passage money were "wrongfully and
deliberately" applied by respondent to his own use and benefit "in reckless disregard of
his obligations to refund [350 U.S. 532, 534] the same" and that respondent "has
secreted himself away and manipulated his assets . . . for the purpose of defrauding"
petitioners. Then follow allegations of certain fraudulent acts and transactions.
The allegations of wrongfulness and fraud do not alter the essential character of the libel.
For the ancient admiralty teaching is that, "The rules of pleading in the admiralty are
exceedingly simple and free from technical requirements." Dupont de Nemours & Co. v.
Vance, 19 How. 162, 171172.
And see 2 Benedict, American Admiralty (6th ed.
1940), 223, 237. Though these particular allegations of the libel sound in fraud or in the
wrongful withholding of moneys, it is plain in the context that the obligation to pay the
moneys arose because of a breach of the contract to transport passengers.
Lawyers speak of the obligation in terms of indebitatus assumpsit, a concept
whose tortuous development gave expression to "the ethical character of the law." See
Ames. The History of Assumpsit, 2 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 53, 58 (1888). As Mr. Justice
Holmes once put it, "An obligation to pay money generally is enforced by an action of
assumpsit and to that extent is referred to a contract even though it be one existing
only by fiction of law." Thomas v. Matthiessen, 232 U.S. 221, 235.
I HAVE INCLUDED A PORTION OF THIS CASE AFTER THIS ONE,
THE INFORMER.
The fiction sometimes distorted the law. A line of authorities emerged to the effect that
admiralty had no jurisdiction to grant relief in such cases "because the implied promise to
repay the moneys which cannot in good conscience be retained necessary
to support
the action for money had and received is
not a maritime contract."3 United Transp. &
L. Co. v. New York
& B. T. Line, 185 F. 386, 391. Yet that duty to pay is often referable, [350 U.S.
532, 535] as here, to the breach of a maritime contract. As Mr. Justice Stone said in
Krauss Bros. Co. v. Dimon S. S. Corp., supra, at 124:
". . . Even under the common law form of action for money had and received
repay the moneys which cannot in good conscience be retained necessary
to support
the action for money had and received is
not a maritime contract."3 United Transp. &
L. Co. v. New York
& B. T. Line, 185 F. 386, 391. Yet that duty to pay is often referable, [350 U.S.
532, 535] as here, to the breach of a maritime contract. As Mr. Justice Stone said in
Krauss Bros. Co. v. Dimon S. S. Corp., supra, at 124:
". . . Even under the common law form of action for money had and received
there could be no recovery without proof of the breach of the contract involved in
demanding the payment, and the basis of recovery there, as in admiralty, is the
violation of some term of the contract of affreightment, whether by failure to
carry or by exaction of freight which the contract did not authorize."
The truth is that in a case such as the present one there is neither an actual promise to
repay the passage moneys nor a second contract. The problem is to prevent unjust
enrichment from a maritime contract. See Morrison, The Remedial Powers of the
Admiralty, 43 Yale L. J. 1. 27 (1933). A court that prevents a maritime contract from
being exploited in that way does not
reach beyond the domain of maritime affairs. We conclude that, so long as the claim
asserted arises out of a maritime contract, the admiralty court has jurisdiction over it.
The philosophy of indebitatus assumpsit is, indeed, not wholly foreign to admiralty.
Analogous conceptions of rights based on quasicontract
are found in admiralty. One
who saves property at sea has the right to an award of salvage, regardless of any
agreement between him and the owner. See Mason v. Ship Blaireau, 2 Cranch 240, 266;
The Sabine, 101 U.S. 384, 390; 1 Benedict, supra, 117 et seq. Likewise, where cargo is
jettisoned, the owner becomes entitled to a contribution in general average from the
owners of other cargo which was saved without the aid of any agreement. See Barnard v.
Adams, 10 How. 270, 303304;
Star of Hope, 9 Wall. 203, 228230;
1 Benedict,
supra, 98. Other examples could be given. See Chandler, Quasi Contractual Relief [350
U.S. 532, 536] in Admiralty, 27 Mich. L. Rev. 23 (1928). Rights which admiralty
recognizes as serving the ends of justice are often indistinguishable from ordinary quasi contractual
rights created to prevent unjust enrichment. How far the concept of quasicontracts
may be applied in admiralty it is unnecessary to decide. It is sufficient this day to
hold that admiralty has jurisdiction, even where the libel reads like indebitatus assumpsit at
common law, provided that the unjust enrichment arose as a result of the breach of a
maritime contract. Such is the case here.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for
proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Footnotes
[Footnote 1] There is also an apparent conflict with Sword Line v. United States, 228
F.2d 344, 346, decided, after we granted certiorari, by a different panel of the Second
Circuit from the one which sat in the instant case.
[Footnote 2] The Court in New Jersey Steam Navigation Company v. Merchants' Bank,
6 How. 344, 392, stated that in determining admiralty jurisdiction the inquiry is "into the
nature and subjectmatter
of the contract, whether
it was a maritime contract, and the
service a maritime service, to be performed upon the sea, or upon waters within the ebb
and flow of the
tide. And, again, whether the service was to be substantially performed upon the sea, or
tidewaters,
although it had commenced and had terminated beyond the reach of the tide;
if it was, then jurisdiction has always been maintained."
[Footnote 3] And see Israel v. Moore & McCormack Co., 295 F. 919; Home Ins. Co.
v. Merchants' Transp. Co., 16 F.2d 372; Silva v. Bankers Commercial Corp., 163 F.2d
602. [350 U.S. 532, 537]
The following is the case cited above that bears
importance on the fiction and how you are compelled
to pay an income tax for your contract with the
government. It is based on a level of a dollar amount
which is the possession and use of a federal Reserve
Note which is a debt you had and received in a
transfer to which you are to pay back a portion for
the use of the notes. This is based on the promise to
follow all the rules and regs as a citizen of,
resident therein of the contract, by implied consent
for accepting the artificial character of individual,
which is a word definition defining person in statute
that is the subject of liability. When reading the
following replace "stockholder"/"members" with
citizen/person/ resident and "corporation" with State
or United States.
Thomas v. Matthiessen, 232 U.S. 221, 235.
There remains only the question whether the liability is of a kind that will be enforced
outside of the California courts. Analysis on this point often is blurred by the vague
which is a word definition defining person in statute
that is the subject of liability. When reading the
following replace "stockholder"/"members" with
citizen/person/ resident and "corporation" with State
or United States.
Thomas v. Matthiessen, 232 U.S. 221, 235.
There remains only the question whether the liability is of a kind that will be enforced
outside of the California courts. Analysis on this point often is blurred by the vague
statement that the liability is 'contractual.' An obligation to pay money generally is
enforced by an action of assumpsit, and to that extent is referred to a contract,
even though it be one existing only by fiction of law. But such obligations
when imposed upon the members of a corporation may very very largely. The
incorporation may create a chartered partnership the members of which are primary
contractors, or it may go no farther than to impose a penalty; or again, it may create a
secondary remedy for a debt treated as that of the corporation alone, like the right to
attach the corporation's real estate; or the liability may be inseparable from the local
procedure; or the law may be so ambiguous as to leave it doubtful whether the liability is
matter of remedy, and local, or creates a contract on the part of the members that
will go with them wherever they are found McClaine v. Rankin, 197 U.S. 154, 161
49 L. ed. 702, 705, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 410, 3 Ann. Cas. 500; Christopher v. Norvell,
201 U.S. 216, 225, 226 S., 50 L. ed. 732, 736, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 502, 5 Ann. Cas.
740. In the present case we think that there can be no doubt of the meaning of the
California statute. It reads: 'Each stockholder of a corporation is individually and
personally liable for such proportion of its debts and liabilities,' etc., as we have
stated, and supposes the action against him to be brought 'upon such debt.' Civil
Code, 322. This means that by force of the statute, if the corporation incurs a debt
within the juris[
232 U.S. 221, 236] diction, the stockholder is a party to it, and
joins in the contract in the proportion of his shares.
Now, I hope you are ready to understand what you have
read. All statutes are written for persons,
residents, individuals and are premised on one thing,
citizenship. Citizenship means you are a member of
the corporate body politic of the state or federal
government. So go ahead and call yourself a citizen
of so and so state and you immediately become a
"stockholder" of that State and assume all its debts.
Plus the fact that the State you claim citizenship in
is a "political subdivision" of the United States.
Since all States are corporations and have joined the
parent corporation, The United States, you are bound
to a contract as stated in the cases above. Now you
have ASSUMED the character of a FICTION OF LAW,
namely that of a person, to which all statutes apply.
Now in the definition of person the word INDIVIDUAL
describes person in 26 USC 7701 (a) (1). In my books,
The New History of America and Which One Are You. I
used two cases wherein the Judges stated that the
defendants did not dispute that they were NOT United
States citizens so they were taxpayers. Why people
did not pick up on this is because there is very
little logical thinking minds anymore to deduce the
obvious.
Here is how you become part of a contract, that all
talk about existing, but no one can figure out where
this contract is, to promise to pay the debt of the
State and United States. As the above cases states,
it is where ever the person (stockholder/member) is
that the jurisdiction follows. That is why the IRS
can go into a State contrary to what you all believe
that they can not. Oh yes they can, and you did it to
yourself when using a fiction of law and they came
right back on that fiction of law and nailed you with
your own actions which you cannot shake no matter how
hard you try. They even went to Mexico to get the
person, and when you now read Cook v Tate, it will
become so clear that you will wonder why you did not
see it before. You did not see it before because you
did not have this information before you to digest.
Here is how they did it and looking back to the cases
above it should be evident to you.
You are born a MAN, not a person, or individual. God
created MAN. Did God create person, individual or
citizen? No statutes are written with Man in them,
only person. For only artificial entities can go
after other artificial entities, they cannot attack
MAN. Read "PERSON" article written on
www.atgpress.com/ for further clarification. The
constitution is for members only, the States, not
You are born a MAN, not a person, or individual. God
created MAN. Did God create person, individual or
citizen? No statutes are written with Man in them,
only person. For only artificial entities can go
after other artificial entities, they cannot attack
MAN. Read "PERSON" article written on
www.atgpress.com/ for further clarification. The
constitution is for members only, the States, not
people. People cannot join the Union. To prove it try
to join the Union. States are corporations. People,
MAN, can become a member of a State by registering to
vote or taking an oath to support that contract
called a constitution. Once doing that you are a
stockholder and therefore a citizen of that state.
Citizen is an artificial character and a Fiction of
Law. The statutes of contract are geared toward
person which is artificial in character. Now that you
have claimed citizenship of a State, you are deemed
by the Courts as a person of artificial character.
Artificial characters have no constitutional
protections and are in the same class as other
artificial entities (corporations). To prove this
look at the words that define person in 26 U.S.C.
7701 (a) (1) which are individual, corporation,
association, partnership, trust, estate, and company,
all being artificial entities. Being this is so,your
part of the debt of the government is predicated on
the membership (read in the case above), wherever you
might be. The debt the State has to the United
States, as a Union member, is transferred to all its
members to pay a federal income tax. So it matters
not where you are the IRS can go into the state, any
state, and has jurisdiction because you are a
"person" described in the statutes who is resident in
their political subdivision, the state.
So you are taken into court and claim that you are a
sovereign citizen. Remember "citizen" is an
artificial entity, a Fiction of Law. "Citizen" is not
natural. So the court notes you, by your own
admission, are a "member" of the body politic and
proceeds on that Fiction of Law. You argue you are
not the person liable because the statutes do not
define the activity that makes you liable. The fact
of the matter is, is that you are the " person" in the
statute and the taxpayer in 7701 (a) (14). The person
is what makes you liable, not so much the activity.
So as was posted in the Cooper case on the internet,
that everyone wants to believe that the use of the
post office makes for dual citizenship is totally
wrong. Dual citizenship is predicated on the fact you
are a "member" of a political subdivision (State)of
the United States, ergo have dual citizenship for
taxation as you are responsible for the debts of both
corporations, the State and the United States. So you
are an "individual" required to file an individual
income tax form. I include an excerpt from The New
History of America that proves the point.
U.S. v Slater, 822
USTC 9571
"There is a tax imposed, in 26 U.S.C. Sec. 1,
on the income of `every individual.' No
provision exists in the tax code exempting
from taxation persons who, like Slater,
characterize themselves as somehow standing
apart from the American polity, and the
defendant cites no authority supporting his
position. Slater's protestations to the
effect that he derives no benefit from the
United States government have no bearing on
his legal obligation to pay income taxes.
(cites omitted) Unless the defendant can
establish that he is NOT a citizen of the
United States, the IRS possesses authority to
attempt to determine his federal tax
liability."
Notice the last sentence, and also, they can only
attempt on a U.S. citizen. Now to the other case
which is an Appeal in the Seventh Circuit and she
lost;
Rachel Templeton v Internal Revenue Service, 861363
attempt to determine his federal tax
liability."
Notice the last sentence, and also, they can only
attempt on a U.S. citizen. Now to the other case
which is an Appeal in the Seventh Circuit and she
lost;
Rachel Templeton v Internal Revenue Service, 861363
on appeal from 85 C 457.
"Finally, we address Templeton's second
argument in which she claims that she is not
a 'person liable' or a 'taxpayer', as those
terms are defined by the Internal Revenue
Code and the relevant case law, and as a
result that the provisions of section 6103 do
not apply in her case. We agree with the
district court that this claim is patently
frivolous. As Templeton does NOT dispute that
she is a citizen of the United States, and
because the Code imposes an income tax on
`every individual who is a citizen or
resident of the United States,' 26 C.F.R.
Sec. 1.1(
1) (a) (1985), it would clearly
contradict the 'plain meaning' of the term to
conclude that Congress did not intend that
Templeton be considered a 'taxpayer' as the
term is used throughout the Code."
In both cases the people claimed to be citizens of
(belonging to) the United States, so the tribunals
were absolutely right in their determinations because
they fell under 26 Sec. 1 in USC and CFR. Most
certainly they consented to the jurisdiction in
question. Argue against their codes as mightily as
you want, it matters not. They joined the insurance
club as Spooner stated, didn't they?
END OF EXCERPT.
I don't know how much plainer it can get. That is why
I published the fact that "in law" person, resident,
and individual are all artificial entities. They are
working a fiction of law because you fell right into
legal terminology while NOT, in your mind, thinking
the "legal" definitions applied to these terms. You
helped put the nail in your own coffin so to speak,
by helping the fiction of law prevail against you. So
all the law that you use as a defense is for naught.
As evidenced from the Slater and Templeton case, this
is exactly what has happened all across this country
in every court case before that time, (look at the
Cook v Tate Case) and every case after that. Now you
can appreciate why you lose by this definition
statement to wit;
" a fiction is defined as a false averment on the part of the Plaintiff which the defendant is
not allowed to traverse, the object being to give the court jurisdiction. Black's Law
Dictionary 3rd Ed. (1969) Pg. 468; In the case of "Willful failure to File," the Plaintiff and
court invents the "fiction" that defendant is a "taxpayer", A.K.A. "Person." Motions and
briefs which rely on precepts of law will thereafter be denied or found frivolous."
Now, this is not a false averment on the Plaintiff
because YOU created the fiction of law either by your
actions, or inactions in denying that, you are a
registered voter; a resident of a State; a person, a
individual; a member of a State; a citizen of a
State; a United States citizen; that your
constitution is designed to protect you, OR, claiming
that you are a sovereign citizen. Use any of these
and you, not them, are operating a fiction of law. Do
you think they are going to tell you all these
things? NO!
So let me play devil's advocate. If you are a
"Sovereign citizen" and claim they are your servants,
you are supposed to know all the law that your
servants are to use and you would not use any of the
terms listed in the above paragraph. So why do you
use those terms? Using these terms proves that
sovereign citizen is truly an oxymoron as I have
always stated. The reason is, sovereign is the
opposite of citizen. This is what the masses and the
most educated so called "patriot" cannot fathom
\
"Sovereign citizen" and claim they are your servants,
you are supposed to know all the law that your
servants are to use and you would not use any of the
terms listed in the above paragraph. So why do you
use those terms? Using these terms proves that
sovereign citizen is truly an oxymoron as I have
always stated. The reason is, sovereign is the
opposite of citizen. This is what the masses and the
most educated so called "patriot" cannot fathom
because of the fraud and deceit placed upon you since
childhood. You carry the fraud with you to your grave
and in doing so pass it on to your children so
everyone believes there is this thing called
sovereign citizen. Why people cannot think for
themselves is beyond me. All one has to do is
research the word citizen to see he is under a legal
disability, while Sovereign is not under any legal
disability. The equivalent, respectively, are
prose/pro per and sui juris. Legal terms are not
common terms and are drafted to deceive.
So who is working a fiction of law that will never
allow you to prevail? It is not the government. It is
you. The government courts are only following the law
and what you say. Place yourself as the judge and you
know the "legal terms" that apply in court. You are
bound by oath to give justice. A man comes before you
and claims he is a "person", only not one liable to
pay a income tax. He also claims he is a sovereign
citizen of the State of So & So. He brings in the
argument that there is no statute stating he is
required to file an income tax form or pay a tax.
Knowing he has just stated Fictions of law, you have
to rule by the law. The law says person liable. He
stated he was a person. Since this "person" has
received a transfer over a certain sum of debt
obligations, he, is made liable for the use and
transfer of these debt obligations, see 'Use and
Transfer' and 'Is this what makes you liable', on
atgpress.com. This man did all the work for you in
presenting all the fictions of Law to convict him.
You, as a judge cannot rule against the law. See my
point? Well this concludes another facet of our
problem. Not one single argument will win, but this
is as close as you are going to get. All the articles
on www.atgpress.com/ dovetail to make a neat package.
I give this freely so that YOU, and no one else, can
make the decision that I am lying or telling the
truth. As I say, check my information out and
everyone that states it is wrong. Leave no stone
unturned, as you are the one that suffers, not us.

2 comments:

Anonymous said...

This is such a mess of topics and assertions that are NOT related in any coherent way that it is useless to attempt to make any valid comprehension from the sequence of badly copied and pasted bits and parts of cases. Whoever put this together never bothered to proof read the result or was/is so incompetent as to merely search for key word terms and then paste the resultant crap together.
PS- corporate stockholders are NEVER liable for the debts of a corporate entity unless the corporation is classed as an "S" Corp and treated for tax purposes as a 'regular partnership'. If you do not know that, you stink as a legal advisor/lawyer or attorney.
Rewrite this drivel and resubmit.

Anonymous said...

Being a citizen does not make you a taxpayer. What determines whether you owe the income tax is whether you have income, mostly determined by whether you are participating in a taxable activity. This has been proven time and again by Crackin the Code and losthorizons.com. There you can see actual refund checks posted where the people correctly stated that their labor was not taxable. You can owe the income tax whether you are a citizen or not. Stop feeding the beast with your labor and tell the IRS your labor is not taxable. I cannot comprehend why everyone is not doing this.