SUSPICIOUS RUSSIAN MISSION AIMED AT DISRUPTING U.S. SUBMARINE MONITORS
Reagan Defense expert explains recent activity near America's borders
WASHINGTON – The Russian surveillance ship off the U.S. East Coast that alarmed U.S. Navy brass wasn’t looking to cut fiber optic communication cables, as reported, but was trying to locate sophisticated sensors that detect a submarine’s location, a former Defense Department technology Stephen Bryen, who served as deputy undersecretary for trade security policy under President Reagan, told G2Bulletin that the Russians have no intention of cutting undersea communications cables on which much of the global Internet traffic travels.
He said the sound surveillance system, or SOSUS, deployed by the U.S. Navy off the East Coast detected the Russian activity.
It found the Russians were mapping out the location of the communication cables for possible tapping but they also were trying to determine the location of sensors.
Bryen is author of “Essays in Technology, Security and Strategy” and of the forthcoming “Technology Security and National Power: Winners and Losers.”
Bryen was at the Defense Department when the Soviets undertook a major espionage effort to acquire prohibited sensitive dual military and civilian use technology from Japan and Norway to manufacture specially skewed propellers to silence their submarines.
It was a major Soviet intelligence effort of the KGB to acquire dual-use technology such as multi-axis machine tools from Japan and computer numerical controllers from Norway to make the precision propellers.
While the illegal acquisition of Western technology was halted, the Russians acquired the know-how to fashion the propellers for all of their submarines.
The net effect, Bryen told G2Bulletin, was to make it more difficult for the systems that the U.S. and other NATO countries have deployed to detect the presence of Russian subs.
According to the Defense Department, the illegal acquisition of the technology to manufacture the skewed propellers was a $9 million undertaking. But, for the Navy, the illegal diversion of such sensitive technology has cost some $50 billion to overcome. In some cases, he said, the capabilities have not yet been restored.
“The transfer of vital technology has helped enable Russia’s revolution in military affairs and is once again a threat to the United States and America’s allies,” he said.
The underwater sensors detect the Russian submarine’s acoustic signature, created by propeller cavitation, machinery noise and the sound of the vessel cutting through sea water.
Properly located, the sensors can distinguish one submarine from another, since each vessel has a unique signature.
The sensors transmit the information over an underwater cable to a command center. If located, the Russians can either shut down the sensors or put noise generators in the water to make them ineffective.
Get the rest of this report, and more, from Joseph Farah’s G2 Bulletin.
It found the Russians were mapping out the location of the communication cables for possible tapping but they also were trying to determine the location of sensors.
Bryen is author of “Essays in Technology, Security and Strategy” and of the forthcoming “Technology Security and National Power: Winners and Losers.”
Bryen was at the Defense Department when the Soviets undertook a major espionage effort to acquire prohibited sensitive dual military and civilian use technology from Japan and Norway to manufacture specially skewed propellers to silence their submarines.
It was a major Soviet intelligence effort of the KGB to acquire dual-use technology such as multi-axis machine tools from Japan and computer numerical controllers from Norway to make the precision propellers.
While the illegal acquisition of Western technology was halted, the Russians acquired the know-how to fashion the propellers for all of their submarines.
The net effect, Bryen told G2Bulletin, was to make it more difficult for the systems that the U.S. and other NATO countries have deployed to detect the presence of Russian subs.
According to the Defense Department, the illegal acquisition of the technology to manufacture the skewed propellers was a $9 million undertaking. But, for the Navy, the illegal diversion of such sensitive technology has cost some $50 billion to overcome. In some cases, he said, the capabilities have not yet been restored.
“The transfer of vital technology has helped enable Russia’s revolution in military affairs and is once again a threat to the United States and America’s allies,” he said.
The underwater sensors detect the Russian submarine’s acoustic signature, created by propeller cavitation, machinery noise and the sound of the vessel cutting through sea water.
Properly located, the sensors can distinguish one submarine from another, since each vessel has a unique signature.
The sensors transmit the information over an underwater cable to a command center. If located, the Russians can either shut down the sensors or put noise generators in the water to make them ineffective.
Get the rest of this report, and more, from Joseph Farah’s G2 Bulletin.
http://www.wnd.com/2015/11/suspicious-russian-mission-aimed-at-disrupting-u-s-submarine-monitors/
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