5
takeaways on Geithner and the financial crisis
39 Mins Ago
The New York Times
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Here are several takeaways — and surprises — from my interviews with him, from those around him and from his book. (Some details go beyond the magazine article.)
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U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner testifies
during a hearing July 25, 2012 on Capitol Hill in Washington.
– Mr. Geithner
revealed for the first time that he was initially at odds with Henry M. Paulson Jr., the Treasury secretary at the time, and Ben S. Bernanke, the Federal Reserve chairman, about whether
to bail out Lehman Brothers before the famous weekend meeting at which they
sought to find a solution before the firm collapsed. "This was one of the
few times during the crisis when there was any distance between Hank and me.
There was even some distance between Ben and me. I sensed their advisers
pulling them toward political expedience, trying to distance them from the
unpalatable moves we had made and the even less palatable moves I thought we'd
have to make soon." Later in the book, however, he writes: ''These
disagreements did not turn out to be consequential. Hank and Ben would have the
courage to change course and do what needed to be done.''
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Mr. Paulson
responded: ''While we discussed and sometimes debated tactics, we were unified
in our resolve to avoid the failure of systemically important institutions and
that certainly included Lehman Brothers, where we worked hard right up until
the end to prevent a failure.'' In his own account of the financial crisis,
"On the Brink," Mr. Paulson explained why he was so insistent that
the public believe there was no bailout coming. ''The New York Fed would be
inviting Wall Street C.E.O.'s for a meeting, and we didn't want them to arrive
thinking that we would be there waving a government checkbook.'' Mr. Paulson's
book explains his tactics, which he says were intended to attract private
sector money and a buyer for Lehman to maximize the chances of preventing its
failure.
– Mr. Geithner
said that he had many regrets. "It's clear we didn't do enough," he
writes. "Before the crisis, I didn't push for the Fed in Washington to
strengthen the safeguards for banks, nor did I push for legislation in Congress
to extend the safeguards to nonbanks," he writes. " I wish I had
figured out a way to respond more aggressively to the initial panic, and to
sustain the initial power of our fiscal stimulus. I wish we had expanded our
housing programs earlier, to relieve more pain for homeowners."
– Mr. Geithner's
critics may latch on to this anecdote: He says he felt uncomfortable deriding
Wall Street, so much so that when he was handed talking points for a press
statement he was supposed to make while sitting next to President Obama in the
White House to express outrage at banker bonuses, he refused. "I skimmed
the outrage I was expected to express. I'm not very convincing as any angry
populist, and I thought the artifice would look ridiculous. 'I'm not doing
this,'" he wrote. "Instead, I sat uncomfortably next to the president
while he expressed outrage." He later explained. "I feared that the
tougher we talked about the bonuses, the more we would own them,'' Mr. Geithner
writes, ''fueling unrealistic expectations about our ability to eradicate
extravagance in the financial industry.''
3 Reasons: Buffett says Geithner's book sensational
A quick look at the day's top stories on Squawk Box,
including Buffett's thoughts on former Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner's
new book, with CNBC's Becky Quick and Joe Kernen.
– Mr. Geithner
spent much of his time in the Treasury Department talking tough about ending
"too big too fail" — eradicating the possibility of bank bailouts in
the future — but he said he never believed it was a practical goal to eliminate
it completely. "'Does it still exist?'' he said. ''Yeah, of course it
does.'' Ending "too big to fail" was ''like Moby Dick for economists
or regulators. It's not just quixotic, it's misguided.''
– Mr. Geithner
says he never wanted to be the Treasury secretary, and it was a continuing
struggle with his wife, Carole, who moved to Washington with the family only to
move back two years later. "I remember the moment,'' Carole Geithner
recounted about when she learned he was taking the job. ''He walked in the
door, and I just saw it in his eyes. He couldn't tell me verbally, because we
had a friend visiting who just before said, 'I don't think you need to worry, I
really think [the job] is gonna go to Larry Summers.' And we had to wait till
everyone went to bed, and he told me, but I could tell just when he walked in.
And there's this pit in your stomach.'' She continued: ''I'd already had a
taste of the fishbowl, and I'd also seen other peoples' relationships, what
happens to them when they're in the fishbowl. So I really had a sense of
dread.''
—By Andrew Ross
Sorkin
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