“A hegemon is supposed to solve international crises, not cause
them.” – Christopher Layne, The American Conservative, May 1, 2010
Nothing upsets those drunk on imperialist virtue than the fact it might
end. Such romances with power do have a use-by-date, going off like
old fruit. Eventually, the crippling contradictions will win through in
the end. The days of the US empire are numbered – but then again, they
always were.
The recent round of spring meetings at the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank flutter with suggestions that American economic power
is being shaded, be it by the republic’s own dysfunction, or the
emergence of other powers like China. “People can’t be too public about
these things,” argues Arvind Subramanian, chief economic advisor to the
Indian government, “but I would argue this is the single most important
issue at these spring meetings.”[1]
This would come as a surprise for some. The various theorists on international theory, many slumming at The Weekly Standard,
form the praetorian guard of arm chair defenders of American virtue and
power. Max Boot, writing a piece for the magazine in October 2001,
typified this by arguing that the attacks of the previous month were “a
result of insufficient American involvement and ambition; the solution
is to be more expansive in our goals and more assertive in their
implementation.”[2]
The problem is Barack Obama. They see the Obama administration as a
regime in retreat, which is the theme of Bret Stephens near fictional
work. Indeed, America in Retreat: The New Isolationism and the Coming World Disorder already
gives its readers two issues to stumble over: that there is an
“isolationism” to speak of, and that disorder would be a genuine
problem.
The first issue. For Stephens, the Obama retreat is reflected by the
choice made by the president when he “came to office determined to scale
down America’s global commitments for the sake of what he likes to call
‘nation building at home’.”[3] Stephens assiduously ignores the vast,
expansive and dangerous robotic reach of American power, typified by
remote drone strikes, the backing of proxy regimes and such negotiating
endeavours as the Trans-Pacific Partnership. If only the isolationism
argument was true.
President Warren Harding, in 1921, is said to have placed the US on the
pathway to isolationism with his anti-League of Nations stance, and the
winding down of the post-war military machine. “Vast expenditure
without proper consideration for results,” he warned, “is the inevitable
fruit of war.” Wars, rather than being the efficient earners for a
state, were wasteful enterprises. Avoid those security alliances that
become, more often than not, stifling and awkward embraces.
Therein was born the myth of American insularity, one of considered
geopolitical withdrawal. Such an assessment would ignore continued US
involvement in the international financial system – as indeed, the
biggest creditor economy – and its engagement in various international
organisations, including, to a limited degree, the League itself. This
was Washington without the fangs.
But Stephens, like his colleagues of that most myopic brand of history –
the idea of empire – can see no reason for America to retreat from
anything. Take, for instance, the adventurism in the Middle East.
“There was no strategic or even political requirement to get out of Iraq
once we had succeeded in pacifying the country.”
The efforts of such pacification continue to linger in their
destructive toll, though armchair militarists get goggle-eyed when it
comes to the empirical world. Conservative columnist George Will was
left wondering what the missing factor was in the state building process
and came to a simple, if impossible conclusion. “Iraq is just three
people away from democratic success. Unfortunately, the three are
George Washington, James Madison, and John Marshall.”
Then comes the issue of disorder, which takes the contractarian idea
that, to achieve order in the international system, deals must be made
with hegemons, whether you want to or not. Stability is something
gained by bedding the brute across the ocean, and smaller states need to
cosy up to bigger ones with tarted up appeal.
This system of perceived order was deemed a matter of virtue rather
than good, old fashioned avarice on the part of the great power. “By
dampening great-power competition and giving Washington the capacity to
shape regional balances of power,” argues Stephen M. Walt, “primacy
contributed to a more tranquil international environment.”[4]
Tranquillity, however, remains a matter of degree.
Empires do check into the old home, get on the non-solids and
eventually die from natural causes. Yet Stephens is cautious to suggest
that, while America is in retreat, it “is not in decline.”
This is in stark contrast to others, like Christopher Lane of the George
Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M
University, who sees the US as “increasingly unable to play the
hegemon’s assigned role.”
In any case, a power dedicated to causing more mayhem than policing
stability doesn’t deserve any titles in the hegemonic department. The
otherwise war loving David Frum had to concede after Obama pushed the US
into another conflict in 2011 that, “Three wars is a lot, even for the
United States.” In Layne’s final summation, “The epoch of American
dominance is drawing to a close, and international politics is entering a
period of transition: no longer unipolar but not yet fully
multipolar.”[5]
When the curtains will be finally drawn on the act that is American
empire is not for anybody to say, though the clock ticks with its usual
grinding music. The nature of its power will continue to change, with
other powers emerging from the chrysalis. The question will be whether
such a process takes place slowly, or whether the empire ages
disgracefully.
Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne. Email: bkampmark@gmail.com
[1]
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/18/business/international/at-global-economic-gathering-concerns-that-us-is-ceding-its-leadership-role.html?emc=edit_th_20150418&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=55503776&_r=2
[2] http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/000/318qpvmc.asp
[3] http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/america-retreat-new-isolationism-and-coming-world-disorder_820771.html [4] http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-end-the-american-era-6037
[5] http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/graceful-decline/
http://www.globalresearch.ca/fearing-the-loss-of-hegemony-the-concept-of-us-retreat/5444177?print=1
[3] http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/america-retreat-new-isolationism-and-coming-world-disorder_820771.html [4] http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-end-the-american-era-6037
[5] http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/graceful-decline/
http://www.globalresearch.ca/fearing-the-loss-of-hegemony-the-concept-of-us-retreat/5444177?print=1
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