Thursday, November 6, 2014

VKD. NOW! About those ‘laws’ Obama makes all on his own protecting Organized Crime on Wall Street, the Security Exchange Commission, the GLASS STEAGALL ACT [not lawfully removed just set back in an old dusty corner hoping no one would notice], SHERMAN ANT

NOW! About those ‘laws’ Obama makes all on his own protecting Organized Crime on Wall Street, the Security Exchange Commission, the GLASS STEAGALL ACT [not lawfully removed just set back in an old dusty corner hoping no one would notice], SHERMAN ANTI TRUST ACT, CLAYTON ACT SEC. 8 [MONOPOLIES] .. circumventing the REAL LAW MAKERS.


OBAMA WANTS TO MAKE LAWS ON HIS OWN? PERHAPS HE AND THE US [CORPORATE] HOUSE & SENATE HAVE NOT HEARD OF ” Ferdinand Pecora’s Investigation of the Great Crash Forever Changed American Finance”

READ: Ferdinand Pecora – Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Pecora’s investigations highlighted the contrast between the … Chelsea House. … The Hellhound of Wall Street: How Ferdinand Pecora’s Investigation
Washington[edit]

Ferdinand Pecora was appointed Chief Counsel to the U.S. Senate’s Committee on Banking and Currency in January 1933, the last months of the Herbert Hoover presidency by its outgoing Republican chairman, Peter Norbeck, and continued under Democratic chairman Duncan Fletcher, following the 1932 election that swept Franklin D. Roosevelt into the U.S. presidency and gave the Democratic Party control of the Senate.

The Senate committee hearings that Pecora led probed the causes of the Wall Street Crash of 1929 that launched a major reform of the American financial system. Pecora, aided by John T. Flynn, a journalist, and Max Lowenthal, a lawyer, personally undertook many of the interrogations during the hearings, including such Wall Street personalities as Richard Whitney, president of the New York Stock Exchange, George Whitney (a partner in J.P. Morgan & Co.) and investment bankers Thomas W. Lamont, Otto H. Kahn, Albert H. Wiggin of Chase National Bank, and Charles E. Mitchell of National City Bank (now Citibank). Because of Pecora’s work, the hearings soon acquired the popular name the Pecora Commission, and Time magazine featured Pecora on the cover of its June 12, 1933 issue.[1][2]

Pecora’s investigation unearthed evidence of irregular practices in the financial markets that benefited the rich at the expense of ordinary investors, including exposure of Morgan’s “preferred list” by which the bank’s influential friends (including Calvin Coolidge, the former president, and Owen J. Roberts, a justice of Supreme Court of the United States) participated in stock offerings at steeply discounted rates. He also revealed that National City sold off bad loans to Latin American countries by packing them into securities and selling them to unsuspecting investors, that Wiggin had shorted Chase shares during the crash, profiting from falling prices, and that Mitchell and top officers at National City had received $2.4 million in interest-free loans from the bank’s coffers.

Spurred by these revelations, the United States Congress enacted the Glass–Steagall Act, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. With the United States in the grips of the Great Depression, Pecora’s investigations highlighted the contrast between the lives of millions of Americans in abject poverty and the lives of such financiers as J.P. Morgan, Jr.; under Pecora’s questioning, Morgan and many of his partners admitted that they had paid no income tax in 1931 and 1932; they explained their failure to pay taxes by reference to their losses in the stock market’s decline.

Pecora was a founding member of the National Lawyers Guild: Pecora resigned from the National Lawyers Guild during its third annual convention in 1939 after the vote against his resolution disavowing communists failed to carry in the national vote.[3]

VKD. NOW! About those ‘laws’ Obama makes all on his own protecting Organized Crime on Wall Street, the Security Exchange Commission, the GLASS STEAGALL ACT [not lawfully removed just set back in an old dusty corner hoping no one would notice], SHERMAN ANTI TRUST ACT, CLAYTON ACT SEC. 8 [MONOPOLIES] .. circumventing the REAL LAW MAKERS.

Investigations & Oversight
August 1, 2013
Room Service in the Clink: The Case of the Consumptive Witness
Historical Highlight
May 24, 1972
The House Select Committee on Organized Crime

Historical Highlight
August 25, 1948
The 1948 Alger Hiss–Whittaker Chambers hearing before HUAC

All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”
— U.S. Constitution, Article I, section 1
PIC

President Gerald R. Ford testified before a House Judiciary Committee subcommittee to explain his pardon of President Richard M. Nixon on October 17, 1974. Ford became the first sitting president since Abraham Lincoln to address a congressional investigating committee on Capitol Hill.
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Image courtesy of the Library of Congress

President Gerald R. Ford testified before a House Judiciary Committee subcommittee to explain his pardon of President Richard M. Nixon on October 17, 1974. Ford became the first sitting president since Abraham Lincoln to address a congressional investigating committee on Capitol Hill.
The Constitution says nothing about congressional investigations and oversight, but the authority to conduct investigations is implied since Congress possesses “all legislative powers.” The Supreme Court determined that the framers intended for Congress to seek out information when crafting or reviewing legislation. George Mason of Virginia said at the Federal Convention that Members of Congress “are not only Legislators but they possess inquisitorial powers. They must meet frequently to inspect the Conduct of the public offices.”

Origins

The constitutional framers assumed that Congress would conduct investigations as the British House of Commons conducted them. James Wilson of Pennsylvania, a future Supreme Court Justice and Convention delegate, wrote in a 1774 essay that members of the Commons were considered “grand inquisitors of the realm. The proudest ministers of the proudest monarchs have trembled at their censures; and have appeared at the bar of the house, to give an account of their conduct, and ask pardon for their faults.” When the U.S. House convened in 1789, it established an early set of select committees, such as Rules and Ways and Means, to structure the legislative process including investigations.

Early Investigations

The House used its investigatory privileges in the First Congress (1789–1791). Robert Morris of Pennsylvania, the superintendent of finances during the Continental Congress and a financier of the American Revolution, asked Congress in 1790 to investigate his handling of the country’s finances in order to clear his name of potential impropriety. The House referred Morris’s request to a select committee, setting a precedent for future investigations, while the Senate had President George Washington appoint special commissioners and report back to that body. Representative James Madison of Virginia said that the “House should possess itself of the fullest information in order to doing justice to the country and to public officers.”

Two years later, the House authorized a special committee to investigate the military defeat of General Arthur St. Clair. This was the first time the House investigated an official under the President’s direct supervision. Several Representatives debated whether the House had authority to conduct such an investigation at all. Initially, Representative William Giles of Virginia moved a resolution to request that President Washington launch an investigation. But the House amended the resolution to create a select committee, authorized “to call for such persons, papers, and records, as may be necessary to assist their inquiries.” Washington consulted his Cabinet to discuss compliance with the House’s investigation. They agreed upon rules of disclosure that formed the early basis of what is now known as “executive privilege,” or The President’s prerogative to use private documents and unvarnished advice to formulate policy decisions.

Subpoena Power and Contempt

The House has compelled the attendance of witnesses since 1795, when it investigated an attempt to bribe Members. Indeed, early cases of congressional subpoena and contempt powers focused on the abuse or discredit of the House itself. Robert Randall, a real estate speculator, had tried to purchase what is now Michigan from the federal government and share the proceeds with Members of Congress who approved the sale. As a result, Randall was the first individual held in contempt of Congress. The House Sergeant-at-Arms was authorized to arrest him and bring him before the House, where he was reprimanded and placed in a local jail for a week.

Subpoena power for routine legislative matters evolved after an 1827 debate authorizing the Committee on Manufactures to “send for persons and papers.” The committee, seeking more information on reforming the tariff of 1824, wanted to conduct its own investigation given that voluntary testimony and memorials to the committee had been “in many instances opposed to each other, and contradictory as regards facts.” One Representative denounced the action as an “inquisition” and such power generally as “odious, and oppressive, in the highest degree.” Representative Edward Livingston of Louisiana said it was better to have an independent investigation than rely on voluntary testimony by “those interested to deceive.” Livingston said, “all our laws…would be better, more stable, more wise” if the House conducted its own investigations.

The House reformed and routinized its subpoena and contempt powers during the 19th century. Initially, it had authorized the Sergeant-at-Arms to arrest those disregarding the orders of the House and bring them before its Membership. After an 1857 case involving a reporter for the New York Times who was held in contempt for not divulging his sources for a report concerning potential bribery of House Members, Congress passed the forbearer to the current law on contempt (2 USC §194). In that law, the failure of a witness to answer “any question pertinent” to a congressional investigation would prompt an investigation by the Department of Justice, as well as potential fines and jail time.
Current Practice

Hearings are most commonly held for three reasons: to consider pending legislation; to investigate issues that may require legislation in the future; and, to investigate and oversee federal programs. They reflect the most important issues of the day and what occupies congressional attention. This means that Congress holds hearings on a variety of issues, from steroid abuse in professional sports to the use of weather satellites. Hearings have also been used to further the rights of minority groups. Congressional investigations not only help legislators make better policy decisions, but they are central to the system of checks and balances. Investigatory hearings can uncover presidential abuses of power and corruption, such as the Teapot Dome scandal in the 1920s or Watergate in the 1970s. But hearings have also been used for less noble purposes, such as the blacklisting of private citizens during the “un-American activities” hearings in the 1950s. While the power to investigate is broad, the Supreme Court has since ruled that Congress must confine itself to “legislative purposes” and avoid the strictly private affairs of individual citizens.

For Further Reading
Aberbach, Joel D. Keeping a Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1990.
Barrett, David M. The CIA and Congress: The Untold Story from Truman to Kennedy. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005.
Minta, Michael D. Oversight: Representing the Interests of Blacks and Latinos in Congress. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.
Ogden, August Raymond. The Dies Committee: A Study of the Special House Committee for the Investigation of Un-American Activities, 1938–1943. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1943.
Ogul, Morris S. Congress Oversees the Bureaucracy. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976.
Perino, Michael. The Hellhound of Wall Street: How Ferdinand Pecora’s Investigation of the Great Crash Forever Changed American Finance. New York: Penguin Press, 2010.
 

FOREIGN BANKING ACT DECEMBER 24, 1919. SEC. 43 …

Mar 9, 2003 – That which is due or owing by the government of a state or nation. …. as the Edge, or Foreign Banking Act, approved December 24, 1919.
Please be sure not to miss: Abuse of Act of Congress known as: The Foreign Banking Act, Dec. 24, 1919. Sec. 43 & Sec. 25. Abuse of Powers by The Federal Reserve Banking System “Trust”, empowered by said Act of Congress(?)
SECTION. 43.—FEDERAL FOREIGN BANKING ACT
(Law, Banking and Business. Copyright, 1918, by THE JOHN A. HERTEL CO., Copyright 1921 by THE JOHN A . HERTAL CO.)

VKD. PLEASE NOTE WHILE READING THE BEFORE MENTIONED.. I’LL BET YOU AS DID I found no where in the before-mentioned, the Act of Congress of The Foreign Banking Act, Dec. 24, 1919 whereas; Allowances for THE UNLAWFUL CONVERSION of THE GOLD COLLATERAL INTEREST DUE to the DURHAM HOLDING TRUST (TIAS 12087) or the murder of the former CEO of COSMOS SEAFOOD ENERGY MARKETING, LTD; Russell Herman, or the FORGERY of his signature, or the Allowing of Agreements to SPLIT 50-50 with the AL QAEDA-AL KADDA, ABBU SAYEFF, MILF the “UNLAWFUL CONVERSION” Gold Collateral Interest.. Or the BRADY BONDS, or, or, or..–? Perhaps I missed something in that Act of Congress of December 24, 1919?
Something else I did not see in that December 24, 1919 Act of Congress. I did not see the allowance for the Federal Reserve Board Chairman to go outside the United States and set up a COMPETITIVE BANKING SYSTEM called the EURO DOLLAR with deliberate intentions of BANKRUPTING THE UNITED STATES DOLLAR with about “80%” underwriting in BOGUS BONUS 3392-181 GOLD INSTRUMENTS” written on our GOLD COLLATERAL, THE DEBT OF THE UNITED STATES “without our permission?” Did you?

to be continued later.. V.K. DURHAM, CEO

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